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Abstract 
 
Mainly asserted by the experts, there is a common acceptance that the combination of the 
institutional features of the labour markets play a crucial role to determine if countries are 
more volatile in terms of creating and destroying employment. As a continuation of the 
previous assortment I tried to find out if there is any cross-country empirical relationship 
which relates the institutional features with the Okun’s coefficient. After estimate the 
Okun’s coefficients and carry out an analysis of correlation for different explanatory 
variables, this paper extract the conclusion that the institutional features show a not-so-
clear and straightforward correlation for the different market labour features such as the 
EPL or the temporality, but in an indirect way by explaining the agents adaptability to the 
status-quo changes when facing the shocks. 
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Proporcionen una Norma les Característiques del Mercat de 
Treball per Determinar el Coefficient d’Okun? 
 
És el mercat laboral suec, amb la seva estricte EPL, capaç de reaccionar menys als xocs 
externs? O és una economia dual més flexible en termes de creació i destrucció d'ocupació 
que una economia pro-mercat com Nova Zelanda? Els costos de mà d'obra realment 
importen quan una economia presenta una estructura rígida en termes d’EPL? És el rigor de 
l'EPL la raó per la qual els mercats regulats són més estables o és la seva flexibilitat en 
termes d'ajust dels salaris o la mitjana d'hores treballades pels treballadors? 
Ençà que va començar la crisis al 2008, la greu situació dels diferents mercats laborals, amb 
unes taxes d’atur desorbitades i amb una agreujant dificultat per incrementar l’ocupació, ha 
fet començar altre cop la discussió de quin marc institucional pot permetre a un país tenir 
una evolució més estable del seu mercat laboral davant els canvis. 
Cada país presenta les seves pròpies característiques institucionals en els seus respectius 
mercats de treball i aquesta és la raó per la qual des de 2008 s'han produït evolucions 
diferents dels mercats de treball. Alguns països han demostrat ser més flexible en termes de 
creació i destrucció d'ocupació, mentre que altres han demostrat un complex rigidesa capaç 
de reduir la velocitat de destrucció d’ocupació a més de suavitzar-la. El tema que es tracta 
d'abordar en aquest treball és determinar si hi ha alguna relació empírica entre les 
característiques institucionals dels mercats de treball i els coeficients d'Okun per a diferents 
països? Aquesta qüestió s’aborda per tal de donar una resposta aproximada de quines 
característiques són significativament més rellevant per determinar la volatilitat de la 
desocupació. 
Aquest treball ha intentant esbrinar si les institucions del mercat de treball ajuden a 
determinar si un país presenta més volatilitat en el seu mercat de treball i que aquesta 
causalitat es repeteix per diferents països. Així doncs, mitjançant el càlcul dels coeficients 
d’Okun per diferents països i realitzant l’anàlisi per diferents variables explicatives del 
mercat de treball s’ha volgut comprovar si hi ha alguna relació empírica per explicar la 
variació dels coeficients d’Okun per països amb diferents estructura institucional. La 
conclusió obtinguda de l’anàlisi és que no és palpable una relació directa amb les variables 
que s’han assumit com explicatives, però si de manera indirecta si s’observa com les 
institucions afecten a la conducta dels diferents agents del mercat. 
 
Paraules clau: Protecció de la legislació laboural , la flexiguretat, les polítiques 
d'activació, la llei d'Okun, Hodrick i Prescott filtre, treball ajust de l'entrada, flexibilitat, 
volatilitat, característiques institucionals 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most discussed topics by the experts in the labour market nowadays is about how 
would be the ideal labour market a country should have, whether one labour market where 
firms may hire and fire more easily in a more pro-liberal scheme or a market where high 
strictness of dismissal that impose difficulties and costs to firms at the time to carry out 
layoffs entailing some rigidity in the adjustment and less volatility of the unemployment 
rate. 
 
One might expect that countries with higher employment protection legislation and strong 
unions, which means that firm has more difficulties to fire workers, would present more 
stability in the long run and countries with a more liberal system would be more volatile. 
However, looking at the evolution of the different labour markets, one may easily realize 
that the combination of the different variables is what determine the performance of the 
labour market, as well as how the agents adapt to the established regulation, since can be 
seen performances like the Spanish one that despite having a high EPL for permanent 
employees, the lower strictness of dismissal for temporary, made of Spain the most volatile 
market of the OECD countries, or the ones more proper to more liberal countries that turns 
out to be much more stable than some regulated markets.  
 
In order to give an answer to that, this paper tries to address the issue if the institutional 
schemes of each country affect the volatility of their respective labour markets and 
therefore to provide an indication of which is the most preferable institutional scheme. One 
way to estimate the volatility is establishing the relationship between the changes in the 
unemployment rate with respect the change of the output from its potential level, what is 
known as the Okun’s law. Once the regression is estimated, the coefficient of the output 
gap, which would be compress between 0 and 1 is the slope of the curve, which in other 
words means the volatility of the unemployment rate for a unitary change in the output. 
 
In order to avoid any misleading at the time to compare among countries, I would select 6 
countries which are utterly different in terms of their respective institutional features. For 
instance, for the employment protection legislation, some countries may present higher 
values than others which means that firms are able to fire labour more easily in some 
countries than in others, as a consequence of that and in general terms, this would entail 
that the country with lower strictness of dismissal to have a higher slope, which means that 
the unemployment rate is more volatile with regard the output gap. The simple explanation 
to support that behaviour is because at the minimum signal of decreasing profits the firm 
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which have lower strictness will prone to fire labour since it is not that costly as it would be 
in another country with higher strictness of dismissal, in such case, firms and institutions 
themselves contemplate alternatives procedures, such as reducing the hours worked, which 
is the case of Germany.  
 
Of course, this is an example to explain what the relationship is I am trying to forecast, but as 
is shown in the following pages, the issue will not be as easy as it seems since the volatility 
will depend on the interaction of the different important labour market features which 
compose its institutional framework and how the agents adapt to them or better said, how 
are let the agents adapt to the shocks. 
 
Once I have carried out the estimation of the coefficients, I will plot the regressions to help 
to verify if the institutional features might be significant at the time to explain the result of 
the coefficient, which indeed they are implicitly. But the regressions are estimated by 
establishing the relationship between the unemployment rate and the output gap, not the 
institutional changes, fact that could make us not to obtain a well-establish correlation, 
moreover since most of the coefficients have been calculated from a long run time series, 
some countries present similar coefficients that may induce to the conclusion that there is 
no relation among them. 
 
In the methodology, I will explain what are the criteria I followed in order to select the 
countries, and moreover why I have selected those institutional features by taking a proper 
look to the theory. After that, I carry out the regressions for the different countries, taking 
into account which methodology fits better to obtain the coefficient and also for some 
countries as Spain or Germany, break de series due to sharp changes in their respective 
institutional framework of the labour market. 
 
Once obtained the coefficient for my 6 different countries (7 if I count Spain before 1984 as 
another country). I regress the coefficients against different explicative variables of the 
labour market to check out if there is some norm that provide some rule to explain the 
Okun’s coefficients. 
 
After all, I would like to thanks my Thesis professor, Esteve Sanromà, for all the help he has 
provided me in terms of providing literature, as well as advice for performing the thesis. 
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II.METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, apart from explaining which methodology I am going to use in order to derive 
the Okun’s curve with its so-explicative coefficient, I explain the variables I have taken into 
account with the objective of selecting countries which labour market institutions ensured 
them different performance in their respective labour markets. It is understood for different 
performances, whether in an economy the fluctuations in the labour market are more 
dynamic or not, in other words, if they create and destroy employment easily or on the 
contrary, their institutional scheme ensure them the stability in the long run by applying 
higher strictness of dismissal and pro-adjustment hours contracts. Those variables are the 
Employment protection legislation, temporality, adjustment of the labour input, activation 
policies and passives measures.  
 
Denmark, Sweden, Germany, New Zealand, United States and Spain are the countries 
selected to find out if there is any empirical relationship between the institutional 
framework of their labour markets and its unemployment rate fluctuation. The data of the 
variables considered in order to select these countries has been extracted from the OECD 
Statistics, more precisely, the OECD employment outlook and the labour statistics.  
 
2.1 Selection of the variables  
2.1.1 Employment protection legislation  
 
 
Source: OECD Labour Statistics: Employment Protection Legislation 
Figure 1: Employment protection legislation 
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In the figure 1 pointed within a range between 1 and 6 (from less to more strictness) it is 
plotted the different level of strictness of the OECD members countries. As the main issue of 
this paper is to dictate a final outlook of which is the type of labour market preferable, in 
order to select them, we used the variables which are the key to explain the functioning of 
the different markets. One of them is the EPL, employment protection legislation. The 
strictness of employment protection might be relevant to differentiate the selected 
countries and even crucial going in pair with other relevant variables such as unions which 
turns out in a determined behaviour of a labour market.  
 
In the upturns, firms are not likely to present problems with it since they do not fire workers. 
However, in the downturns, strictness in indefinite contracts may induce to a bigger problem 
since the firm should have to pay a high firing cost and fulfil a determined level of 
bureaucracy which may cause the firm go to bankruptcy, causing the negative effect from 
not shifting labour from the declining sector to the ones appearing in the scene. 
 
The EPL in the temporary employees is as well significantly relevant because as a result of the 
oil crisis many governments decided to increase the flexibility of the labour markets by 
introducing the temporality, but this turns out to be in a double edge gun, since countries with 
disparity between the strictness of dismissal of temporary and infinite employees have seen 
how its unemployment rates reached high levels in the 2008 crisis and also in previous crisis. 
 
Figure 2: Strictness of dismissal for temporary employment 
Source: OECD Labour statistics 
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As a matter of fact, the employment protection legislation for temporary employees does 
not specifically implies that the country with higher value close to 6 will not present 
temporal workers in its economy, since this indicator built by the OECD labour experts 
establish an starting point conditions of which would be the ideal contractual scheme for the 
temporary workers, and at the minimum institutional drift from this conditions make the 
value change considerably. Conditions such as that only the enterprises with more than 50 
employees may employ temporary workers or that the job carried out by the person 
employed must be specifically temporary.  
 
As a consequence of that, the best way to know not only which are the countries that 
present a lower strictness of dismissal for temporary workers is the temporary employment 
rate .It also helps to know which one of them maintain a dual scheme of its labour market, 
where the strictness of dismissal for the temporary worker is lower than the one for 
permanent workers, in such case, it makes the labour market more volatile and increase the 
labour input adjustment in persons in downturns as well as in upturns. 
 
Figure 3: Temporary rate of employment 
Source: OECD Labour Statistics   
 
The labour market statistics of the OECD regarding the cost of hiring a worker is also taken 
into account, even if it is included in the dismissal strictness, it provides us with the idea of 
which economies pay higher labour cost, because in those countries the temporary 
employment may play a principal role in the evolution of the labour market and the 
adjustment of labour due to a shock can be faster and painful. To sum up, the EPL is an 
important variable to take into account when analysing for behavioural differences in the 
labour market. When studying this variable there is clear finding to say that for itself, is not 
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as relevant as it is when combined with other institutional features. The slope of our 
estimations will depend on the institutional scheme and its relation with the others. 
Countries presenting higher strictness of dismissal do not have necessarily present lower 
slope indicating that the labour market fluctuations are more stable in terms of destroying 
and creating employment. Since higher strictness of dismissal mixed up with lower strictness 
of dismissal of the temporary labour might make the firms have preferences for the 
temporary labour, which in the end, is less costly to fire, conditioning the industrial 
structural of an economy and of course, the stability of the labour market, which is the case 
of Spain. Or could be facing a labour market where the strictness of dismissal is one of the 
higher of the OECD like in Sweden, but the strong trade union membership and coverage 
make even both types of labour hard to adjust easily, fact that make its labour performance 
much more stable. Without doubt, it is worthy trying to find out if there is any relationship 
with the EPL and the coefficient, not only for the EPL by itself but when combined with other 
variables. 
 
2.1.2 Labour input adjustment 
 
Note: Change measured from peak to trough during the 2008‐09 recession (quarterly data). Total change in labour input is 
decomposed into changes in hours per worker and number of employees. Data source: OECD (2010) 
 
Figure 4: Adjustment of total labour input relative to output change- decomposed between hours and 
persons 
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In the previous figure can be observed relevant information which provides us with a lot of 
analytical explanation of which economies present higher slope at the time to estimate the 
Okun’s coefficients. The institutional features may cause the labour market have more or 
less volatility, but in the end, it turns out to be just a matter of an interaction between the 
worker and the firm.  
 
First of all, firms when assessing their future profits, decide to hire or not labour, regardless 
the type of industry where the firm will be localized, which might be conditioned for the 
different firing cost (EPL) for temporary or permanent workers. Depending on the disparity 
of the EPL between both types of labour, one economy could be more prone to focus on 
developing sectors based in temporal labour if that is less costly and less difficulty to fire, 
and assuming that the temporary employment is formed mainly by unskilled labour; firms do 
not hoard this labour in the downturns since is somewhat redundant by the type of sector 
they are concentrated, where the firms do not invest formation in them. As a consequence 
of that, we find more volatility in those countries where there is high temporary 
employment and there are disparities between both EPL.  
 
In figure 4 is plotted the desegregation between the adjustment through persons and hours 
of the relative change in labour with respect the change in output. Here there is clear 
evidence of which countries are more likely to be stable in the long run and those which are 
not. 
 
This variable also extends to the issue of which is the industrial structure of the economy. 
Depending on the EPL regulation of a labour market, this one might promote the 
development in certain industries where firms need to invest in high-skilled workers and 
carry out formation programs. 
 
It is straightforward to see how countries which present a free market scheme or have 
disparity between their EPL have adjusted in the extensive margin, through firing persons. 
Whereas countries which a much more economic structure based on high quality labour, a 
well-designed welfare systems, as well as, efficient protective systems, present an 
adjustment of the output through the intensive margin, which means reducing hours 
worked. 
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2.1.3 Activation and passive (insurance) measures 
 
Table  1: Amount of money spent by unemployed in activation policies and passive measures 
 
Source: Own elaboration from OECD labour Statistics; Note: Categories (10-70) includes form PES and administration till 
start-up incentives inclusive. (20-70) includes training till start-up incentives and passive measures (80-90) is composed by 
the out-of-work income maintenance and support and early retirement 
 
Apart from the ELP, another variable which may play a crucial role in the differentiation of 
the labour markets is the market programs carried out by the government, the passive such 
as the unemployment insurance and the activation policies. The fact why we think this 
variable is important is because the activation policies are a key feature of the triangle of the 
flexicurity of countries such as Denmark, which according to the experts, it have helped 
them achieve an outstanding performance in its labour market thanks on its dynamic system 
with a high rate of job finding. 
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 Activation policies 
 
I strongly think the activation policies have much to do to explain the labour market volatility 
in an economy. The activation policies are determinant to achieve a higher activation rate 
which may induce a fast job creation.  Those types of policies have shown incredibly 
effective at the time to increase the intensity of the job searching by establishing a closer 
control of the unemployed population. The main function of these policies is to elabourate a 
connection between the unemployed population and the vacant, so that the time of job 
searching is delayed the minimum time possible and also reduced the lack of intensification 
of the job searched caused by a generous unemployment benefits. A clear example of these 
characteristic policies is Denmark or Sweden, as we can see in the table; both countries 
present a high expenditure by person unemployed, in the case of Denmark, is a much more 
dynamic market where the strictness of dismissal is quite low but it compensate it with a 
high rate of activation by ensuring a rapid match between both parties by providing training 
and new formation, while in Sweden, it focuses in government occupation programs and 
providing employment incentives. 
 
Countries presenting a liberal scheme in its institutional frameworks, as well as in its labour 
market do not need to design such policies since its unregulated market facilitate the 
adjustment by the market itself, since in these countries the government do not spend 
neither in activation policies nor unemployment insurance is not that high, the unemployed 
population is in some way on their own and intensify the job search once they got 
unemployed since there is no unemployment benefit available or at least not as much as 
other countries with a more important welfare system. 
 
 Passive measures 
 
Including all the safety net that a worker receives form the employment agency, the passive 
measures for unemployed population may be a relevant variable as the activation policies. I 
partly belief that jointly with the activation policies, the unemployment benefits or how 
generous are they as well as how long they are given might be important to explain certain 
degree of volatility in the labour market. Having a system were the unemployment insurance 
is very generous might cause the worker retard the job searching, which means a loss of 
intensification that entails a mismatch between the unemployed and the vacant. Obviously, 
this effect can be mitigated by having a well- designed activation policy. However, it is clear 
that this variable is less important when talking about an economy where firms do not 
destroy employment, but hoard it, fact that depends mostly of the type of labour and the 
industrial structure of an economy. 
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2.2 Selected countries  
 
 Denmark 
 
The EPL of Denmark is 2.3 (for both individual and collective summed up), which is the OECD 
average value of strictness. Denmark individual dismissal strictness is lower, around 1.5 and 
the underlying reason of why this low index can be found in the economic structure of the 
Danish productive system, because there are plenty of small firms for which it is quite costly 
to maintain the high strict labour protection. Denmark is an economy which labour market 
presents quite high dynamics in its evolution since they are primarily defined as a 
“flexisecure” market, with a very high activation rate as well as separations, having high 
unemployment reduce search incentives and therefore in order to compensate the effect a 
well design of activation policies are needed in order to deal with the moral hazard and 
promote the job searching. In Denmark, the longer the individuals are unemployed the more 
intensive become the activation, even getting to the full-time level, moreover, the youth 
individuals got to be activated after three months of being unemployed on average, whereas 
in other economies, where there is little prevention and few activations measures and it is 
more difficulty to prevent the moral hazard and provide the correct incentive.  
 
Its flexicurity triangle (lower strictness of dismissal, generous safety net and activation 
policies) has made Denmark achieve an outstanding performance of its labour market. A 
market where you find the so-needed nowadays dynamics in terms of labour adjustment 
that in combination with a well design activation policies ends up in a low unemployment 
rate and a high activation rate. 
 
Nevertheless, recent studies have proven that the effectiveness of the activation policies has 
declined during the previous crisis, creating a mass of unemployment which has become 
structural. Furthermore, as we can observe in figure 4, Denmark during the crisis, with the 
output decreasing and the demand shrinking, most firms took the decision of adjusting in 
the extensive margin and fire people rather than adjusting hours. This gave us evidences of 
how the small firms, which represent a quite important part of the economy, over-hire 
labour in the upturn since this has not a cost that high and as a consequence of that they 
tend to overestimate its expectations of output production, creating more jobs, which would 
not be hired if they had to consider another scenario less optimistic. 
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To sum up, the Danish labour market, stands as the regulated market with more dynamics of 
the countries selected and showing a not so high volatility as can be expected from a flexible 
market.   
 
 Spain 
 
The basic characteristics of the Spanish Labour market are typically characteristic of a labour 
market with a high disparity between the temporary labour and the permanent one. It never 
had the same coefficient or headway in the labour market. Before 1984, Spain presented a 
structure based on a labour market with high firing cost and powerful unions and a reduced 
level of temporary employment, but after the oil crisis, the government in a desperate 
attempt to tackle the unemployment introduced the temporary contracts. Fact that has 
conditioned the great distresses the Spanish labour market has suffered until now, 
worsened by the deficit of social agents coordination. The EPL has in some measure affected 
the type of industry that developed in Spain. Then, there is a clear differentiation between 
the evolution of the labour market before and after 1984. Two regressions will be 
determined and applied at the analysis that this paper tries to provide a final remark. There 
are papers defending that this situation have changed after the great recession, which rose 
the unemployment rate to the 25%, from the 12% (supposed to be structural) in 2006.  
 
The measures that the government applied, reduced the disparity between the two EPL 
(temporary and permanent labour), but it continues to be less costly to hire a temporary 
worker in the long run and besides that, they carried out measures to impulse the wage 
moderation, which do not affect to the slope of the Okun’s coefficient but I does so by 
closeting the tendency line to the origin, which means that the output needed in order to 
decrease the unemployment rate has decreased, once it is taken into account the active 
population growth and the compensation per worker (see De Cea & Dolado 2013). I do not 
dispose of information of which is the amount, or the money budget for activation policies 
for Spain, but they are clearly insufficient to maintain a high activation rate, since the 
separations are clearly higher than the recruitment in all the downturns since 1984 due to 
the high rigidity of the working and pay conditions, as a consequence of that there is a high 
mismatch between the vacant and the unemployed.  
 
 Sweden 
 
Sweden presents a slightly higher value around 2.5 (with both collective and individual 
strictness of dismissal). Even though its value is not that high, the empowered unions and its 
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high firing cost around the average of the OECD countries have made Sweden to be much 
dependent of the temporary job than partner’s countries. The classic market which 
government activation policies and the temporary job with very low level of strictness of 
dismissal as well as hiring; have been proven as the main cause of employment creation in 
the Swedish economy, since the permanent employment is quite rigid in terms of being 
dismiss but at the same time flexible when it has to adapt to a new scenario. Sweden is a 
very particular case but it is worth studying it because as a labour market with high EPL and 
temporality, where the strictness of dismissal is lower in the temporary employment, I 
should expect a high rate of unemployment during a long period after the crisis.  
 
But, the Swedish system itself, with its high EPL in the permanent contracts and strong trade 
unions, has made of the indefinite employment as labour very hard to get rid of it, and the 
temporality is not that high when compared with other countries with disparity in its EPL 
and it concentrates the younger population with unqualified skills.  
 
There is some sort of activation policies, but as opposite to the Denmark ones, which are 
mostly destined to the training and employment incentives for the firms, are focus on 
provide job in the government programs. Although Sweden present the characteristics of a 
volatile labour market, the pressure carried out by the unions and the negotiation power of 
the workers, has made of Sweden preserve a relative stable evolution in the long run.  
 
 New Zealand  
 
New Zealand, jointly with the United States is the country with the lower index of strictness 
employment dismissal of the total OECD countries. First of all, New Zealand does not have 
collective dismissal since the liberalization process engaged in 1984, with the labour reform 
which established that the contractual agreement had to be done by an individual 
bargaining process between the individual and the employer, so that new contracts were 
more adapted to the necessity of the firm and not to a legislation which could prevent the 
reallocation of workers due to burdensome firing cost imposed.  
 
The New Zealand Index is around 1, quite higher if compared with United States, which value 
is around 0.3. This country has been selected because even though it is supposed to be a 
flexible economy, the rapid job creation and the dynamics of this labour market will stand as 
an alternative of a stabilized unemployment rate with respect the output growth than an 
economy presenting a higher strictness of dismissal. Furthermore, since the agreement is 
established between the employer and the employee, the durability is also stipulated.  
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 United States 
 
Even though one might think that the United States is the most flexible economy of the 
OECD, when estimating the Okun’s coefficient, it turns out to be around the average of the 
OECD, with a value close to 0.5. As New Zealand, United States lack of an institutional 
framework and firms enjoy of an unregulated market which have to fulfil few dispositions, 
but those not even increase the cost of the labour. 
 
Presenting a bit of strictness in the collective dismissal does not entail any prevention for the 
labour market to adjust automatically, but, if we look at the figure 4 of how the decrease in 
output is adjusted, whether the intensive margin or the extensive, approximately half of it 
was adjusted in the intensive margin, revelling one of the most important characteristics, 
which is that a very relevant part of the industrial structure is based on high-value industries, 
where the firms go ahead with important investments in human capital, investments that 
they do not want to lose due to a downturn and therefore hoard the labour by adjusting in 
the intensive margin with the hours worked. 
 Germany 
 
Germany stands as the OECD country with the highest strictness in employment dismissals. 
As a completely opposite country from the ones mentioned before, Germany presents a very 
high Index, the underlying reason of why is the system is the complex protection system 
designed for the infinite contracts employment. Furthermore, the firing costs are 
exceedingly high in infinite contracts in comparison with the temporal ones. Germany has 
always been in the intensive margin of adjustments by hours and not by persons, the main 
explanation for that is the strictness EPL of which the German infinite employees enjoy, 
which avoids firms over-hiring labour in the upturns in their own firms and reduces the 
volatility of the labour market. Creating long term job tenures and facing the shocks by 
adjusting the hours worked and not employees. This is why I selected this country because it 
is a clear example of the jobless recovery, where the output grow but not necessarily the 
employment since there are other mechanism in motion and the labour market is 
indistinctly to the others economies less volatile.  
 
Germany employment adjustment was done almost all in the intensive margin. Having the 
highest EPL in the OECD and one of the lowest unemployment rate in Europe, would stand 
as the best alternative of labour market, where the temporality is focused on the youth 
unskilled labour force and where the structure of the economy preceding the labour market 
is vital, based on high value added industries, with complex system of synergies among 
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investigation centers and companies. What is relevant at a time to study the German labour 
market is to consider the relevancy of its institutions at the time to explain the lower 
unemployment rate (see Boeri and Bruecker 2011, OECD 2010). These institutions defend a 
short-time work system that guarantees a more stable fluctuation of the labour force since it 
reinforces the idea of adjusting employment by hours and not by persons and make firms 
refrain from layoffs, moreover, the employment agency is able to reimburse the 60 or 70% 
of the part of the wage the employees are not obtaining. Under this system, a firm which 
may be facing some financial difficulties might apply to the employment agency in order to 
carry out a package whereby the firm in problems may adjust the hours worked, as well as 
the pay in proportion. There is evidence which demonstrates that this system leaded to a 
more adjustment in the intensive margin throughout reducing hours and less in the 
extensive one (see Abraham and Houseman), entailing then a more output growth required 
since once the situation gets better and the expectations improve, there will be a recover in 
the hours worked not in employment. The firm may be able to adjust the hours worked by 
each employee, and of course pay wages in accordance with the hours worked. 
Furthermore, in recent search (see Burda and Hunt 2011) is shown evidence of another 
reason which might be relevant to explain the economic miracle. During the 2005/07 export 
growth boom, the German firms did not hire much workers as it was expected and the 
underlying reason of that is the expectations the firms made about the context of the 
economy was that the boom would have not last long, and indeed they asserted well. Then, 
as we have seen previously, in contrast with the Denmark or New Zealand firms, the ones 
located in German measured the profitability of hiring a worker assuming a scenario where 
the boom would not last very long.  
 
Figure 5: German manufacturing firms’ business assessment  
 
Source: VoxEU working paper 
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The countries have been selected with detail, taking a look at the Employment Protection 
Legislation, government expenditure in activation policies, as well as passive measures and 
although it has not been included in the explanation, I took a look at the coverage rate of the 
trade union (from OECD), I chose edge countries, some with a very high EPL others with non-
existent or residual and others presenting medium values, the same happens with the EPL 
for temporary workers. The procedure have a simple explanation , which is that in order to 
check out if there is any sort of relationship between the Okun coefficients and the 
institutional features, there have been selected economies with different labour markets 
features and different evolutions, but as well different labour markets with not so different 
evolutions though. The extreme cases, which have already been revealed in previous 
investigation papers, are Spain and Japan (Japan not included in the regression). The rest of 
the OECD countries present values around 0.5 with slight differences among each other. 
 
2.3 Estimations of the Okun’s coefficients 
 
2.3.1 Review of the theory 
 
In 1962, the economist and mathematic Arthur Okun established an empirical relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the output growth of an economy. According to the 
author, assuming a natural unemployment rate, as well as for the output, deviations from 
the potential output may end up causing the shifting of the unemployment rate. The 
affirmation of the Okun’s law is supported by the textbook, where and economy facing a 
downturn and having high unemployment, by stimulating its demand, would create 
employment in the short run, initiating a virtuous circle.  
 
There are some critics that go against the belief of the fulfilment of the Okun’s law. Some 
studies with international data establish that Okun law is unstable in some countries, where 
fails and overestimate the augment of the unemployment. Furthermore, since USA is one of 
the countries I estimated, might be important to mention that some observers have proven 
Okun law misleading when assessing the fall of the employment in the last three recessions, 
in the short run and defend that there was a jobless recovery because the unemployment 
rate did not fall as much as the Okun law predicted. And the most recent critic is that the last 
recession has broken the rule and it is no longer useful as a macroeconomic tool. 
 
However, the Okun theory is valid in the long run, like it is affirmed in Ball et al_2013 
OkunLawFitat50 (IMF working paper). This paper provides evidence that the Okun law is 
stable for USA and many OECD countries in the long run. 
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The same IMF paper commented previously refuse the affirmation of Knotek 2007, author 
that defend that there was a change of origin in the recession that were not included when 
estimating the rule. However, by carrying out the estimations with dummy variables for the 
recessions, the authors of the paper prove that there is any significant change of the 
coefficients 
 
De Cea & Dolado provides a different view. In their study, by assuming a CRS production 
function, derive a well-founded labour demand, which depends on the wages growth and 
the active population. They derive the output thresholds in order to boost employment or 
stabilize unemployment, obtaining result such as that Spain after the reforms imposed by 
the government would only require some rate of growth higher than 1.2% in order to create 
employment. However, this is not exactly a law, since what these authors do is assume the 
evolution of the values of wages, active population as well as productivity, which are 
variables that are relevant to explain the distance from the origin to the vortex. These 
authors do not take as assumed in the short run the evolution of the wages, active 
population or productivity, just the contrary of the other methods that estimate and unique 
Okun curve; this is what they call the black-box. 
 
Generally, the most important drawback of the Okun law is that the institutional features of 
each economy are different, and some may find more difficulties at the time to boost 
employment, whereas they destroy it rapidly. From this affirmation is done one of the most 
reliable critics to the curve, that does not fit well the mismatch between the unemployed 
and the job, and other frictions that cause more drawbacks at the time to make increase the 
employment. 
 
 The interpretation of the curve is straightforward to define since in the end it turns out to 
be a macroeconomic tools that provides us a coefficient indicating how the unemployment 
rate shift, in which degree, when the output growth in a time period is higher or lower than 
the potential one. With a coefficient of 0.5 would mean that the unemployment rate shifts 
halve of the same variation of the output. So, the value of the Okun’s coefficient, the closer 
to 1, the more volatile is an economy because the meaning of that is that the output 
deviations from the output trend has a higher effect on the unemployment rate. 
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2.3.2 Estimation procedure  
 
The method used for the estimation of the Okun coefficient is as follows: 
 
1) First, I estimate the potential values, which is the trend, for the unemployment and 
the output. In order to achieve that, we filter the variables with the Hodrick and 
Prescott filter. I try other filters for the problem of estimation of the edges, but I 
found no significant differences. The problem of the HP filter is that, the estimations 
of the trend might be affected by larger deviations in the extreme, like the one we 
have during the Great Recession. Even though is not accepted for some economist, 
we might find the trend estimations plausible because as we have seen during the 
crisis, in most countries , especially in the European ones, the connection between 
workers and jobs has been affected, with the consequent increase of the natural 
unemployment rate and have also reduce the potential growth of each economy. On 
the other hand we smooth the series with a parameter lambda equal to 100. I chose 
this value because is the most common used for annual data, I also try lambda equal 
to 1000 but I does not improve the fit of the model. 
 
2) Treatment of the data: Once extracted the smooth trend, I take logarithm for the 
output values and take the difference (The series of the variables are taken in level, 
even though there are some complications when assuming the natural rate of the 
unemployment or the trend of the output it provides more significance power to the 
sample), for the unemployment rate only differences are taken since the value is 
already in percentage.  
 
3) Using the Gretl Statistical program we carry out the estimations, the coefficient 
associated to the output gap is the Okun coefficient which is compress between 0 
and 1. We also look at the R squared to check out the fit of the model as well as the F 
statistic for the global significance of the model. 
 
The Data used has been obtained from Ameco Database, the series of Gross Domestic 
Product, constant prices and unemployment rate. The series is from 1960 up to 2013. 
Notice that, when facing possible structural changes in the series such those in Spain or 
Germany because of institutional reforms that represented a great change in the evolution 
of the labour market two estimations are regressed accordingly with each period.  
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Importantly, I break the series for Spain for before and after 1984, year where the Spanish 
government implemented the reform of the “Pactos de la Moncloa”, from which the most 
important institutional drift was the appearance of the temporary contracts. Furthermore, I 
divide the sample for Germany to check out if the Kartz reforms influenced the Okun’s 
coefficient. 
 
Taking a look at the data obtained from Ameco, the unemployment rate for most countries 
is very low in the early 60s and 70s, countries such as Denmark or New Zealand present very 
low unemployment rate variation from 1960 to 1980. Therefore I decided to carry out the 
estimations from 1960 to 2013 and from 1980 to 2013. As I mentioned before, this might be 
important because the unusual stability of the unemployment rate regardless the output 
growth could bias the estimation of the coefficient. 
 
Another complication comes out for Germany, the reason why I chose the Ameco database 
is because would let me obtain data from 1960, but the series for Germany is divided 
between West Germany before 1990 and Germany after that date. As a solution, the data Of 
Germany has been extracted from the OECD database. 
 
Once I obtained the coefficients I carry out a cross-country analysis to find out if there is any 
correlation between the Okun coefficient and the institutional features as explicative 
variables for the behaviour of the labour market, but not necessarily are specific features, 
since I include some performance variable to check out for correlation as well. 
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III. RESULTS  
 
 Spain: 
 
Output  1: Spain before 1984 
 
 
The coefficient associated the output gap is -0.29, and the R squared is 0.46. I realized we 
might have a problem of robustness since during all the period the unemployment rate keep 
itself very stable but from 1980 onwards there is a rapid increase. However, since assuming 
the same unemployment rate increase and the same output negative growth of 1975 yields 
a similar coefficient I decided to keep the slump of the 1980 in the regression. 
The coefficient is quite possible since the Spanish labour market was composed by an unique 
powerful union and very high firing cost, around 41 days per year worked. 
 
Output  2: Spain after 1984 
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The following output is for Spain after 1984 until 2013, as we can see it’s a completely 
different situation from the one previous the assigned date. The model shows a higher 
explicative power as well a higher coefficient, which is what we expected, a value around -
0.73. I check out for stability dividing the two subsamples by two. In the first range I found 
some instability in the first range compress between 1960 and 1984 but no proof of 
instability in the other section of the series, the more volatile 
 
Figure 6: Okun’s curve for Spain, 1960 to 1984 
 
 
Figure 7: Okun’s curve for Spain, 1984 to 2013 
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 New Zealand: 
 
For New Zealand, I estimated the Okun coefficient by taking the series since 1980 to 2013. 
The explanation of why I take such an action is due to from 1960 to the 80s, New Zealand’s 
unemployment rate hardly change 2 percentage points and remained lower than 1% until 
1977. 
 
Output  3:  New Zealand 
 
 
The regression yields a coefficient of -0.40. The model is globally significant and the R 
squared is around 0.60 which is an acceptable fit of the model. 
 
Figure 8: Okun’s law for New Zealand, 1980 to 2013 
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 Denmark: 
 
I estimate the Okun’s law with a temporal series that compress from 1980 to 2013 
The results are a coefficient lower than 0.5 which is what I expected taking a look at the 
evolution of the unemployment rate for the series.  
 
Output 4: Denmark 
 
 
Figure 9: Okun's curve for Denmark 
 
 
The coefficient is -0.47 and the R squared of 0.65 imply a good fit of the model, although is 
not that high as Spain (1984-2013), which is one of the highest of the total sample.  
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 Sweden: 
 
Output 5: Sweden 
 
 
For Sweden I considered to estimate the Okun’s coefficient for the period 1960-1980, but 
the low unemployment rate in the 60s and earlier 70, as well as its little variability, move 
downwards the Okun coefficient when I included the period 1960-1980. Therefore I decided 
to estimate from 1980 onwards. 
 
The coefficient yielded is -0.45, and the R squared is 0.63, which is higher than the 0.60 of 
the 1960-2013 regression. 
 
Figure 10: Okun's curve for Sweden 
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 Germany:  
 
In the German case, I considered to break the series at the point where the government 
introduced a wide array of flexibility measure, the reforms named the Kartz reform. But 
there are no significant differences and the evolution of the unemployment rate does not 
change drastically in the sense it does not turn out to be more volatile as in the Spanish case. 
 
Output 6: Germany 
 
The Gretl output yields an estimation which r squared is the lowest, with only 0.33. The 
coefficient is -0.23, value which is somewhat realistic if I take into consideration that the 
main adjustment of employment per change of total output was done almost everything by 
hours, at least, in the last slump of 2008-2009 (see figure 4).  
 
Figure 11: Okun’s curve for Germany from 1980 onwards 
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 United States:  
 
Output 7: United States 
 
 
As I commented previously, since the Ameco database provided me with data separating 
West Germany and Germany, in this case I extracted the data from the OECD Statistics.  
Until now the Okun’s law for USA has been the regression that has fitted best of all. With an 
R squared nearly 0.8, and the coefficient is -0.46. 
 
Figure 12: Okun’s law for USA, 1960 to 2013 
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I do not consider starting in 1980 as the other countries since USA have neither structural 
breaks nor important labour market reforms that might have affected the evolution of its 
labour market. 
 
In the following table are written the coefficients, the adjusted R squared, as well as the 
standard deviation. The result I obtained were the ones expected when firstly I carry out an 
analysis of which characteristics have each labour market for those economies. Furthermore, 
by taking a look at the evolution of the unemployment rate, we also find quite possible the 
values yield by the regressions.  
 
Table 2: Results of the regressions 
 
Source: Own elaboration from Gretl outputs 
 
All the regressions yield an R squared superior than 0.3. Countries such as Spain after 1984, 
New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden and the United States the R squared is higher than 0.6, 
whereas Spain before 1984 and Germany are lower. In the next section, I am plotting the 
different explanatory variables against the values of the β of which I suspect could have 
some sort of relationship at the time to explain or determine the Okun’s coefficients. 
 
Even though it is clear there is a cause-consequence effect of these variables over the Okun’s 
coefficient, sometimes it’s difficult to find a clear empirical relationship for the different 
variables when the Okun’s coefficients themselves are determined by the interaction and 
the effects among the different features of the labour market rather than a consequence of 
a single variable. 
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IV.EXPLANATORY VARIABLES FOR CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF THE 
OKUN’S COEFFICIENTS 
 
Table 3: Explanatory variables for each country considered to have some relationship 
 
 
4.1 Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
 
Figure 13: Regression of the EPL against the Okun’s coefficients 
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Even though there is a clear relationship in a theoretical aspect, we also find some empirical 
relationship, even though is not that well defined, because for Spain (after 1984) even 
having a high EPL for individual dismissal, as the temporary contract present lower 
difficulties as well as lower cost for dismissal, its labour market is quite volatile since the 
structure and the evolution of the labour market are quite dependent of the temporary 
labour, which represents the 23% of the total employment. 
 
Whereas for the case of Germany and Spanish economy before 1984 are clear. Germany, for 
the contractual system which promotes adjusts the employment by hours and Spain for the 
existence of high EPL and for the absence or low participation of the temporary labour. 
Apart from Spain, for the selected countries, we find evidence that, the lower the EPL, the 
higher the Okun’s coefficient and therefore the volatility of the labour markets. 
Nevertheless, the assertion mentioned before cannot be applied for New Zealand and the 
United States, since those countries, even though having a very low EPL, are placed in the 
centre of the regression, entailing that the causality is not seen when including unregulated 
economies. 
 
4.2 Temporary employment rate 
 
Figure 14: Regression of the temporary employment against the coefficients 
 
As I commented when I was analysing the countries that I had selected, the rate of the 
temporary employment was the best way to measure the EPL of temporary employment as 
well as its representation over the total employment. Therefore, I decided to test if there is 
any relationship. 
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As we can see in the graph, countries such as Germany, presenting a 13% of temporality 
stands as the country with lower volatile of the unemployment rate for output deviations 
from the potential rate, but as I commented previously, this is cause for other reasons, such 
as the contractual scheme applied by the general employment agency. The same happens 
for Sweden, even though having a high temporality rate, its Okun’s coefficients is similar to 
those of Denmark or New Zealand. As a conclusion, for the selected countries, there is no 
clear empirical evidence that establish the lower the temporary employment rate, the lower 
the Okun’s coefficient. However, there is indirectly some sort of relationship since the 
volatility cause of the temporary job will depend exclusively from two aspects. First, the 
disparity between the EPL for permanent and temporary workers and also will depend on 
the unions strength. 
 
Figure 11: Radial chart for the Employment protection legislation, temporary employment 
rate and the Okun’s coefficient 
 
 
Source: OECD Employment Statistics and coefficients obtained from Gretl 
 
The previous chart is another way to show how the economies such Germany, Sweden or 
Denmark, where the higher EPL, implies lower Okun’s coefficient, only and only if this is not 
accompanied with high temporality fact caused by the disparity between the firing cost of 
both types of labour. 
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4.3 Percentage of the employment destroyed (temporary) over the total 
 
Figure 16: Regression percentage of the employment destroyed (temporary) over the total 
against the Okun’s coefficients 
 
 
 
The previous graph regress the Okun’s coefficient for the percentage of the employment 
destroyed that was temporary during the slumps that each economy suffered. The periods 
and the years of employment reduction are specified in the legend of the table. 
 
As can be observed, I find some evidence that address the issue of some sort of correlation 
which establishes that the higher is the percentage of the total employment destroyed that 
is temporary the higher is the Okun’s coefficient. One might thing that this is rather a 
consequence and not an explanatory variable, but since the temporality is cause by the 
interaction of the different features of the labour market such as the EPL, unions or the lack 
of regulation as well, that simply make the temporary labour less costly for some industries 
and therefore detach labour when there is a shock that affects the economy. 
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4.4 Employment adjustment by reducing persons 
 
This variable is expressed as the proportion of the output change that was adjusted through 
employment and not by hours in the slump of 2008-2009, the variable have been design 
from the same data used in the graph 5 with the OECD Database (2010).  
 
Figure 17:  Regression of the percentage of the adjustment in persons with respect the total 
labour input adjustment against the Okun’s coefficient 
 
 
 
This variable turns out to be the most explicative of the Okun’s coefficients, since it provide a 
generous explanation for more and less volatility, which indeed, as the variable remarks, is 
the effect of the jobless recovery. Germany, with its contractual scheme, jointly its industrial 
structure which promotes human capital investment is the one with lower coefficient, on the 
contrary Spain, which entire adjustment was through labour is the one at the top. 
 
There must be some confusion in determining what is first, if the EPL disparity conditioned 
the creation of a certain type of industry, and according to the type of industry developed, if 
it requires more abilities or skills in particular for the labour hired then a system in which the 
adjustment is carry out more by hours than in persons is more likely to be implemented and 
in motion. Whereas, could be as well that the lack of such contractual scheme have limited 
for an excessive regulation, may have cause difficulties at the time of creating jobs in certain 
industries. 
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4.6 Length of the slump 
 
Figure 18: Regression of the length of the slump against the Okun's coefficients 
 
 
 
Each economy presents its own period of recession, Germany from 2001 to 2004, Spain, 
Denmark and Sweden during the Great Recession and each of them had their own cause and 
affectability of the economy. However, the previous graph shows how the economies where 
recession lasted for more time are placed in the centre of the graph and at the top right 
corner, presenting higher Okun’s coefficient. However, for the German case we may find 
some exception since in its slump were destroyed more than 1 million jobs (half of it in the 
period 2003-2004). I found this explanatory variable the one less correlated with the Okun’s 
coefficient, since it has to be taken into account the intensity of the employment 
destruction. In the case for the Spanish economy, there was a sharp destruction during the 
first three years, whereas in Germany the peak of destruction is focused in one year length. 
For New Zealand, its slumps never last more than 1 year, but maybe is a question of less 
affectability of the global economy slumps.  
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V.CONCLUSION 
 
Even though the final analyses do not provide highly significant results of correlation, part 
due to the small sample we are treating and besides that, the difficulty at the time to 
measure the effect of the combination of the different employment regulation in an 
economy, I might say that, indeed, the institutional features help at the time to analyse 
cross-country Okun’s coefficients deviations. 
 
In the country sample I have selected, I made a distinction by key elements that make them 
perform differently from the rest. Germany, the adjustment through hours promoted by the 
general employment agency; New Zealand, for letting the employer and the employee 
decide its contractual agreement through a particular bargaining process between both of 
them; Denmark, the flexicurity; Sweden; its strong unions and low labour mobility ;United 
States and Spain 
 
At first sight, there has to be done a distinction among the more pro-market economies and 
those who present a higher regulated markets. When taking a look at the countries around 
the average values, may be found regulated economies, even though these are regulated in 
order to facilitate the matchmaking of the market, as the case in Denmark, but economies 
such as New Zealand present similar values as well, determining that, at the time to carry 
out a cross-country analysis, since they are not likely to present features in common, cannot 
be compared analysing the same variables.  
 
However, I found out that not for having low EPL, countries will have higher Okun’s 
coefficients since pro-market economies of our sample shows coefficients similar to those of 
Sweden or Denmark. Nevertheless, for labour markets which are regulated, I confirm a light 
correlation between the EPL and the Okun’s coefficients, but that as well as the pro market 
economies, can be explained by other factors in combination with the EPL, as have been 
exposed in this paper. 
Do the Institutional Features of the Labour Market Provide a Norm 
for Determining the Okun’s Coefficient? A Cross-country Analysis 
 
 
40 
 
Table 4: Explanatory table 
 
 
 
The trade unions also play a crucial role in affecting how the institutional features determine 
the Okun’s coefficients. Unions strengthen the bargaining power of workers and support 
them with expertise bargaining procedures that ensure them adequate wages as well as 
other insurance, moreover, the decisions or regulation applied by unions are applicable to all 
the workers. I find this as an explanation as why Sweden, even though presenting the 
characteristics of an economy which labour market should be more volatile, yield an Okun’s 
coefficient of 0.46. The key issue is the Sweden responsiveness to the shocks. The coverage 
rate for Sweden is one of the highest in Europe, as well as the participation, that make of 
Sweden one of the most unionist countries in the world.  
 
Sweden presents a quite centralized wage bargaining system, or at least, this is adequately 
coordinated with the other institutions responsible for bargaining procedures. One might 
think that as a consequence of that, Sweden would be one of the countries with more rigid 
wages, but the some experts assert that the Swedish wages are sensible to output growth, at 
least much sensible as a liberal economy, like United States, around 0.5. This imply that 
unions do not oppose to reduce wages in order to keep employment active and avoid a 
sharp increase of the unemployed population, which is what happens in Spain, as a 
consequence of the rigidity of wages to the cycle. Therefore, the Spanish firms face a rigid 
system where the unique solution is detaching the temporal labour.  Then, The Swedish 
system guarantee the stability by letting more flexibility in the adjustment of wages making 
the Swedish economy less affected by shocks. I found a similar explanation for Germany 
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when studying its temporality rate. The temporary employment for Germany is 
concentrated among the youth population and the unskilled ones, like in Sweden. Then, the 
minijobs clearly create some sort of instability but do not overtake the flexibility of the 
hour’s adjustment that ensures the stability of the labour market.  
 
Previous papers confirm the explanation, German firms are less likely to layoffs since it is 
costly to adjust labour in Germany (high EPL) than for instance in the United States. 
Therefore in the short run, German firms are carry out labour input adjustment through 
reducing hours, whereas in United States, is through workers (see Labour Adjustment under 
Different Institutional Structures: A Case Study of Germany and the United States Upjohn 
Institute Staff Working Paper 94-26 Susan N. Houseman and Katharine G. Abraham) 
 
Furthermore, in an event of a downturn, layoffs are also delayed for the previous 
notification the firm has to do and moreover the negotiation of the social plan (in case of 
collective dismissal). By reducing the average hours worked by worker and reattributing only 
the hours maintain, complemented with wages adjustment is the main characteristic that 
explain the low Okun coefficient of the German economy. Without asserting if the industrial 
structure of the country is first of all determined by the labour market features, which 
indeed it is in certain degree. The same industrial or sector development may influence in 
the type of labour that is created. Investment in human capital entails hoarding this kind of 
labour in the downturns, since it turns to be more costly in terms of the investment in 
formation of the worker. On the contrary, the Danish labour market leaves to its social 
partners the responsibilities of negotiation of the labour conditions at a minor level and with 
independency. Then, the employer’s organization and the trade unions are the main 
institutions upon pay and working conditions are stablished and they are left to the self-
regulation. However, since this would entail a high flexibility of the labour market at the time 
to adapt to a new situation when a shock may affect the economy, the fact that Denmark 
has a low EPL, make firms not to have so high adjustment cost through persons and deter 
adjustment through average hours worked. Nevertheless, it is compensated with the huge 
amount budget for activation policies that compensate the rapid destruction of employment 
with an effective match between unemployed and the vacant job.  
 
The conclusion of this work is that the institutions do not stablish a so clear straightforward 
relationship between them and the Okun’s coefficient. On the face on it, and having plotted 
the regressions, can be confirmed that indeed some of them do have some sort of 
correlation, but this correlation is done in an indirect way, which is the adaptability of the 
agents to the shocks. On the face of it, the employment protection index is significant to 
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explain the Okun’s coefficient, but it is in fact, for how affect the behaviour of the agents or 
how those, firms and workers, take their decisions. With high EPL, firms have higher cost 
when they adjust labour input in the extensive margin, therefore the will fire less in the 
short run. Then it might be said that having high EPL is associated with a low Okun 
coefficient. However, this rule do not fulfil for all countries, since regulated market do not 
precisely need of a high EPL to be less volatile, but more flexibility in the pay and working 
conditions, that somewhat can be granted by trade unions which task is ensure the correct 
adjustment of wages or hours in order to keep away massive layoffs.  
 
The same rule can be applied for the temporality, even though presenting low strictness of 
dismissal, firm will not only appeal to hire this kind of labour since they can apply the 
measures commented by establishing arrangements between the social partners. 
Those are the reasons why countries such as New Zealand or United States present almost 
the same Okun’s coefficient than Sweden or Denmark, with an EPL inexistent and all the 
bargaining procedures left to a simple negotiation among employers and employees, they 
proven to be as stable as the regulated European economies and as flexible at the time to 
modify working conditions as the European countries. 
 
The Okun’s curves estimated for Spain validate once more the conclusion. Previous to 1984, 
the Spanish labour market was characterized by high firing cost (around 40 days per year 
worker), strong union in defence of the labour conditions and very empowered in terms of 
negotiation procedures. Therefore, the regression yields a low coefficient. After the 80’s 
reform, the evolution change drastically, the Spanish labour market turned out the most 
volatile one in the world (in terms of the Okun’s coefficient). The disparity between both EPL 
(permanent and temporary workers) turn the scales in favour of the temporary workers, fact 
that jointly some measures during the 90s, make of Spain the third country with higher 
temporary work rate of the OECD countries. Apart from that, the rigidity of wages to the 
cycles due to the disavowal of the unions to modify the assigned labour conditions establish 
in the collective agreements exacerbate the shocks, since firms do not find for themselves 
any other option than to fire the temporary ones, having previously hired them, conditioning 
the type of industries that have developed as well.    
 
So in the end, and as I have asserted before, the rigidity when adapting to the new labour 
conditions during or after a shock is directly influenced by the labour market institutions and 
provides an explanation of why such coefficients. 
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